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I. SUMMARY OF REBUTTAL ARGUMENT 
The City's brief makes the conclusory statement that nothing has changed since 
Haik I and Haik II (City Br. I 0), failing to acknowledge that the City's newly filed 
lawsuit demonstrates the incongruity between its position, on one hand, that it can hold 
water rights with expressed intent not to use them while, on the other hand, employing 
those same water rights as the basis for preventing use by others. The City's alleged 
standing in this case is premised wholly and specifically upon the allegation that the 
Haik's private water right, Haik v. Sandy City. 2011 UT 26 ("We therefore affirm the 
district court's entry of summary judgment quieting title to the water right in favor of the 
Haik Parties."), injures and interferes with the City's water rights. The City argues that 
"The Haik v. Sandy City decision does not affect the validity of the conveyance from the 
Bentleys and Saunders and Sweeney to Sandy City. (R2011, 169) 
This new and independent claim by the City of injury and interference not only 
defies the doctrine of stare decisis, See State v. Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477,481 (Utah 2003); 
State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995), but it also presents a new and 
dispositive fact wholly changing the landscape that proved the basis of Haik I and Haik 
II. Haik is not claiming the right to acquire the City's rights under appropriative law but 
rather seeking the Court declare whether the City's rights can be a basis for alleged injury 
or interference given the City's premise. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
By alleging injury and interference, the City put at issue specific questions raised 
in the counterclaims regarding the City's water rights and their use: there cannot be injury 
to or interference with the City's rights and use if the City is obliged to serve the very use 
which the City alleges causes the injury and interference. 
In addition to failing to substantively address this new fact, the City did not 
present a statement of facts relevant to the issues. (City Br.) The City did not challenge 
any of Haik's stated facts relevant to the issues presented for review. (City Br.) The City 
failed to conform to the requirements of U. R. App. 24(a). By ignoring U. R. App. 24(a), 
the City did not address the effect of its pleading in this case. The City's Complaint 
newly and independently put at issue the City's water rights and use; and, thereby 
properly gave rise to the declaratory relief pied in the counterclaims. 
The City also failed to apply the proper standard of review in its analysis: "factual 
allegations are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts 
are considered in a light most favorable to" Haik. Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 332 
P.3d 922, 932 n. l (Utah 2014). Accordingly, claims will survive dismissal "so long as 
their allegations, taken as true, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, satisfy 
the requirements of our standing test". Brown v. Div. of Water Rights of the Dep't of 
Natural Res. of Utah, 228 P.3d 747, 752 (Utah 2010). "Under a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, 
our inquiry is concerned solely with 'the sufficiency of the pleadings, [ and] not the 
underlying merits of [the] case.' Oakwood Viii. L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 
1226, 1230 (Utah 2004 ). 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The byproduct of the City's failing to abide by the governing standard of review is 
that the City ignores the facts which changed circumstances and show the lack of identity 
and absence of finality. It is these new facts that render claim or issue preclusion 
inapplicable and underscore the real need for constitutional interpretation by this Court. 
II. REBUTTAL ARGUMENT 
a. City's Suit for Injury and Interference Changed Circumstances 
As Haik recited in its opening brief, the City alleged "The water rights claims of 
Defendants currently and materially injure Plaintiffs by placing a cloud of record on 
SLC's title to LCC water rights." (R2002, ~24) (Br. Haik pp. 15) And "The City sued 
Haik alleging his claim to water "will interfere with the Plaintiffs' respective rights to 
divert, treat and provide LCC water to the members of the public served by Plaintiffs". 
(R2017, ~119) (Br. Haik p. 33) Haik then explained "the State law counterclaims are 
pied solely for declaratory relief in response to claim of injury and suit by the City". (Br. 
Haik p. 41) 
The City did not sue Haik until more than 16 years after decision by Judge Jenkins 
in Haik v. Town of Alta, et al (R3207-R3236); 15 years after decision by the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Haik v. Town of Alta, et al (R3238-R3243); and more than I 
year after decision by Judge Stewart in Haik v. Salt Lake City Corporation, et al (R3 l 96-
R3205). (R000 1-R00 11) The City sued Haik before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
issued decision in Haik v. Salt Lake City Corporation, et al. (R3 I 84-R3 l 94) The City 
sued Haik before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Judge Stewart's dismissal 
3 
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on grounds of preclusion based upon the same cases asserted in this matter in Haik v. Salt 
Lake County Bd. Of Health. (Br. Haik, pp. 39-40) 
These Federal courts could never have adjudicated the City's present allegation 
that "The water rights claims of Defendants currently and materially injure Plaintiffs by 
placing a cloud of record on SLC 's title to LCC water rights." (R2002, if24) These 
Federal courts could never have adjudicated the City's allegation in this action that 
Haik's claim to private water "will interfere with the Plaintiffs' respective rights to divert, 
treat and provide LCC water to the members of the public served by Plaintiffs". (R2017, 
1119) 
In Haik v. Town of Alta, the Federal District Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals; could never have adjudicated the City's water rights because the City admits it 
"did not list SLC's many approved change applications". (Br. Haik, p. 24) The City 
admits: "Judge Jenkins did not directly address the claim that Art. XI, § 6, of the Utah 
Constitution requires the City to provide water". (Br. Haik, p. 15) Similarly, in Haik v. 
Town of Alta, the Federal courts could never have adjudicated whether Haik's water right 
injures the City because this Court did not quiet title until May 10, 201 1, Haik v. Sandy 
City, 2011 UT 26. 
Further, in Haik v. Town of Alta, the Federal courts could never have adjudicated 
whether the City's letter of May 23, 2011 implements an unlawful policy or custom of 
Salt Lake City Corporation of denying water service in Albion Basin, including to the 
Haiks, as evidenced by the memoranda of the Director of Public Utilities; nor whether as 
4 
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a direct result of the May 2011 letter, the Salt Lake Valley Health Department and the 
Town of Alta denied approvals sought by Mark Haik to allow construction of single 
family homes in Albion Basin Subdivision. (R3082 iJiJ76-77) The City sent its letter 
more than 12 years after those Federal decisions. (R3080 iJ70) 
Haik v. Salt Lake City Corporation, et al, commenced on October 25, 2012. 
(R3 l 99) The complaint alleged nothing about the water right quieted in favor of Haik by 
this Court in Haik v. Sandy City, 2011 UT 26. (R3068-R3182) The City moved to 
dismiss and never alleged in answer or counterclaim that Haik's water right claim 
"currently and materially injure Plaintiffs by placing a cloud of record on SLC's title to 
LCC water rights" or that Haik's water right claim "will interfere with the Plaintiffs' 
respective rights to divert, treat and provide LCC water to the members of the public 
served by Plaintiffs". (R3 l 96-R3205) 
b. "Nothing New" Arguments Erroneously Ignore City's Pleadings 
The City's argument "[t]here is nothing new" is error. (City Br. p. 25) Under the 
proper standard of review, this Court must assume the truth of the pleadings favorable to 
Haik. Applying that standard, it is indisputable the 'transaction" changed when the City 
sued for injury and interference with its rights arising from a right quieted only in May 
2011. The City cannot point to any prior case in which its allegations of injury or 
interference exist or were adjudicated. 
What is particularly compelling about this point are two aspects. First, the City 
~-withheld~· from Judge Jenkins its approved water rights. To then argue the existence of 
5 
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the -~withheld" water rights was a fact barring subsequent adjudication lacks merit. 
Second, the fact at issue is allegation of injury or interference caused by Haik's private 
water right recognized more than twelve years later. Plainly, Haik could not have raised 
either point in the prior action. 
Haik' s counterclaims do not stem from a decades long-effort but rather a lawsuit 
brought by the City against him. In that lawsuit, the City alleges injury and interference 
caused by Haik's private water right claim affirmed in May 2011. Never before had 
Haik's private water right been adjudicated. The City's lawsuit is indisputably a "new 
and independent" claim opening the door to this Court applying Article XI, § 6, and the 
related questions concerning how the City's conducts the public's water business. 
The City's argument "[h]ere, there are no 'new facts"' is likewise wrong. (City 
Br. p. 27) That argument essentially contends Haik should have sued the City asking a 
Court declare whether Haik's private water right could injure City water rights 
anticipatingfuture allegation by the City that: 
68. The Bentleys and Saunders and Sweeney, Inc. sold any water 
rights they had relating to lands under the South Despain Ditch to Sandy 
City in 1977. Any adjudication in which it was concluded otherwise is not 
binding upon Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs were not parties to that proceeding. 
69. The Haik v. Sandy City decision does not affect the validity 
of the conveyance from the Bentleys and Saunders and Sweeney to Sandy 
City. 
70. One requirement for water rights to pass as an appurtenance 
is unity of title. Ownership of the water rights in question and the land in 
question must be the same. After the conveyance to Sandy City, no 
conveyance of land by Saunders and Sweeney or the Bentleys could carry 
by appurtenance any part of the South Despain first primary award. 
6 
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(R2011, 1168-70)(Br. Haik, pp. 50-51) The City never presented its allegations Haik's 
private water right caused injury or interference in any earlier suit. The City's allegation 
that this Court's adjudication "does not affect the validity of the conveyance from the 
Bentleys and Saunders and Sweeney to Sandy City" is not "one that could and should 
have been raised in the first action". Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 471 F.3d 1142, 
1146 (I 0th Cir. 2006) citing Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93. 
Haik is not engaged in claim-splitting but rather defending himself because the 
City rejects this Court's decision and alleges claim of injury or interference never 
previously raised. Haik could not raise allegations not yet made by the City. Essentially, 
the City contends the prior adjudication stripped Haik of any defense to the City's never 
before raised claim of injury and interference. The City's contention does not fall within 
any exception to the new and independent claim rule. 
The City argues adjudication (under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) that Haik lacks a federal 
constitutional right strips him of right to declaration of how State constitutional 
guarantees apply to new claims of injury lacks merit. Haik simply could not raise his 
defenses to City claims of injury never previously made. None of the prior Courts could 
adjudicate injury and interference never alleged by the City. Haik did not fail to assert 
his counterclaims as the question only arose because the City sued. Here the Federal 
courts did not even exercise any supplemental jurisdiction. Other than erroneously 
interpreting Article XI, § 6, the City cannot point to any adjudication of any state issue. 
7 
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c. Primacy Approach and Jensen Mandate Constitutional Analysis 
The City's arguments as to Jensen misapprehend the core point of that decision. 
This Court recognizes "the primacy approach, which dictates an analysis of state 
constitutional law before addressing any federal constitutional claims." Jensen v. 
Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ~ 46. The District Court departed from primacy and erred due 
to the differing constitutional standards: "Because the state and federal standards for 
determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to damages for a constitutional violation are 
different, a federal court determination that the material undisputed facts do not give rise 
to a federal constitutional violation does not preclude a state court from deciding whether 
those same facts will give rise to a state constitutional violation." Jensen v. Cunningham, 
201 1 UT 17, ~ 49. 
How the State constitutional standards now apply in the context of the City's 
claim of injury and interference allegedly caused by Haik's private water right need to be 
adjudicated. It is precisely because the trial court failed to undertake State constitutional 
analysis that this Court must reverse and remand, with guiding constitutional principles 
for applying Article XI, § 6, and other constitutional provisions, appropriation statutes, 
and prior appropriation precedence. 
The City's jurisdictional arguments misapprehend the point. What is new and 
independent in this action is that the City rejects decision of the court of last resort 
quieting title in favor of Haik. The City's alleged injury and interference is premised 
wholly and specifically upon Haik's private water right. It is the Citis premise that 
8 
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takes this case out of claim and issue preclusion. The City's argument of injury and 
interference are founded upon a void deed. 
Unlike claim and issue preclusion, a more fundamental doctrine is stare decisis. 
The novel aspect of the City's alleged injury and interference is its rejection of a point of 
law to which the lower Courts are bound. It is the City's argument that a void deed gave 
rise to injury to and interference with the City's water rights that erodes the foundation of 
judicial integrity and the rule of law, and fosters needless litigation. 
It is the City's premise which most clearly shows the difference in issues, the lack 
of finality, and the need for this Court's guidance in interpreting the Utah constitution. 
Having asserted jurisdiction, the trial court cannot then split the City's claims between 
those made before and after the City alleges injury and interference. Having made a new 
and independent claim of injury and interference, the City brought with it the proper 
meaning and application of the Utah Constitution, statutes, and prior precedence. 
As to any jurisdictional implications of the City's premise; this Court, and other 
courts, always have jurisdiction to consider their jurisdiction. W. Water, LLC v. Olds, 
2008 UT I 8, if 42, citing Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 230 F.3d 923, 926 (7th 
Cir. 2000). 
And, contrary to the City's argument, the five issues raised in the counterclaims 
are not "identical to those raised in either or both Haik I and Haik If'. (City Br. p. I 3) 
Brief comparison is appropriate. 
9 
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d. City Put at Issue Constitutional Basis for Its Water Rights and Use 
As to the first counterclaim, the City asserts Haik seeks declaration as to his 
"entitlement to water supply as authorized by Water Rights 57-10013 (al6844) or 57-
10015 (al6846) to serve homes in Albion Basin Subdivision." (City Br. p. 14) The City 
omits the actual request: "Counterclaim Plaintiffs seek declaration determining their 
rights, status, and other legal relations as to the City arising from or relating to Article XI, 
§ 6; and their ownership of lots within Albion Basin Subdivision including their 
entitlement to water supply as authorized by Water Rights 57-10013 (a16844) or 57-
10015 (a16846) to serve homes in Albion Basin Subdivision and the status of the 1963 
agreement asserted by the City and used as a basis for denial of approval by the Salt Lake 
County Board of Health." (R2779, ,I122) 
Haik is squarely entitled to declaration because, after the prior Federal decisions; 
the City put at issue its "LCC water rights" and its "rights to divert, treat and provide 
LCC water to the members of the public served by Plaintiffs" at issue. (R2002, iJ24; 
R2017 ,II 19) "[I]nasmuch as its authority and responsibility to furnish water to its 
residents derives from our Constitution," the City squarely placed at issue the 
constitutional provision from which it derives water rights and upon which the City 
premises injury. Salt Lake Cty. v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119, 121 (Utah 1977). 
Haik falls squarely within a "member of the public" inasmuch as his property is 
part of the City's approved municipal service area of Water Rights 57-10013 (al6844) or 
57-10015 (a 16846). Given the City is now suing members of the public whose property 
10 
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can be served by approved water right but who are denied water by the City; "it would 
seem advisable that there be either some clearer understanding or some contractual 
arrangement defining mutual rights and obligations". Id. Whatever the prior Federal 
court interpretations, this Court holds "authority and obligation to interpret Utah's 
constitutional guarantees, including the scope of due process, and we owe federal law no 
more deference in that regard than we do sister state interpretation of identical state 
language." State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49; Gray v. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 681 P.2d 807 
(Utah 1984 ). 
By alleging injury and interference by Haik, the City put at issue its water rights 
and their use: there cannot be injury to or interference with the City's rights and use if the 
City is obliged to serve the very use which the City alleges causes the injury and 
interference. 
e. Article I, § 24, Never Adjudicated by Federal Courts 
As to the second counterclaim the City similarly obfuscates asserting "whether 
SLCs refusal to supply water to his Albion Basin lots violates his right to equal 
protection" was "decided in Haik I, and in Haik II in the specific context of the post-Haik 
I facts Mr. Haik again relies on". (City Br. p. 16) In Haik I, the first three counts only 
allege claims against the Town of Alta, not the City. (R3056-R3059) Nothing in those 
counts pertains to Haik's water right or the City's allegation of injury or interference; 
rather each centered on Alta's acts and the Town's annexation of Albion Basin 
Subdivision. (R3056-R3059) 
11 
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In Haik I, the last two counts sought declaratory and injunctive relief, respectively. 
(R3060-R3 06 I) The Fourth Count centered upon whether Alta's Water Supply 
Agreement barred extension of water and entitlement to receive water from Alta. 
(R3060) The Fifth Count centered upon preventing Salt Lake City and Alta from raising 
the Water Supply Agreement as a defense to the extension by Alta of its water lines to the 
Haik's property; and requiring Alta to make available to the Haik's Albion Basin property 
the municipal services necessary to receive a building permit". (R306 I) 
This focus upon the Water Supply Agreement is clear as Judge Jenkins wrote: 
As noted above, however, Salt Lake City has no legal duty to furnish water 
to users outside its own city limits, be they 'similarly situated' or not. As 
an owner of water rights, Salt Lake City's role in this instance is proprietary 
rather than administrative. The equal protection yardstick is simply not 
available to measure Salt Lake City's exercise of its contractual powers to 
consent pursuant to Paragraph 8 of the Water Supply Agreement. 
(RI 809-10) The City admits it "did not list SLC's many approved change applications". 
(Br. Haik, p. 24) The City further admits: "Judge Jenkins did not directly address the 
claim that Art. XI, § 6, of the Utah Constitution requires the City to provide water". 
(App. Case 13-4050 Doc O IO I 9097685, p. 26) 
The City's assertion obfuscates by implicitly extending this ruling from Alta's 
"Water Supply Agreement" to "SLC's many approved change applications" never 
disclosed. The City's omissions obfuscate by arguing to extend the ruling from limited 
"proprietary" ruling to a broad "administrative" ruling. 
It is precisely the City's omission of the "'administrative" which moved the City's 
duty into "a ministerial act about which it would have no discretion" as opined in Rose v. 
12 
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Plymouth Town, 110 Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285, 286 (Utah 1946). (R2769-70, ,r8 I). 
Moreover, by keeping "SLC's many approved change applications'· from the Federal 
court, the City kept from the Federal courts that the City line had already been "drawn 
differently". (City Br. p. 17) It is the City's loss of "discretion" which the City 
obfuscates by failing to carefully articulate the record. 
Judge Jenkins appeared to recognize Article XI, § 6, bore directly upon duty to 
supply: "The general duty imposed upon municipalities by Article XI, § 6 of the Utah 
Constitution, viz., that "all such waterworks, water rights, and sources of water supply 
now owned or hereafter to be acquired by any municipal corporation, shall be preserved, 
maintained and operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable 
charges," presupposes that the water to be supplied to inhabitants has already been 
lawfully acquired by the municipality." (R3223 n. 13)(Emphasis added). The City 
withheld from Judge Jenkins the City's already lawfully acquired water to serve the 
homes at issue. (R2758 ,r,rI0-12; R2760 ,r,r22-24; R2764 ,r50; R2768 ,r73) 
In Haik II, new facts were presented sufficient to assert Federal equal protection 
claims. (R3190) In Haik II, the Complaint first alleged Salt Lake City Corporation 
violated the guarantee of equal protection afforded to the Haik by Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (R3163-3 l 64 if~521-528) 
That Complaint then alleged Jeffery Niermeyer, the Director of Public Utilities, in a 
personal capacity violated equal protection guaranteed to Haik by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. (R3164-3 l 69, ~if530-557) Relief as to 
13 
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equal protection was only sought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the 
Federal constitution. 1 (R3 l 8 l) 
Unlike the Haik II complaint, the second counterclaim seeks declaration of 
uniform treatment under the Utah Constitution: "Counterclaim Plaintiffs seek declaration 
determining their rights, status, and other legal relations as to the City arising from or 
relating to Article I, § 24; and whether they are entitled to be treated uniformly with other 
inhabitants of the City's municipal service area defined, among other ways, as "those 
areas that have been included by approved change application" whether the property is 
within or without municipal corporate boundaries." (R27791124) The counterclaim sets 
out specific facts evidencing lack of uniformity and differential treatment. (R2764-
R27691149-77) 
Nothing in the Tenth Circuit's opinion suggests that Court in any manner 
interpreted or applied Article I, § 24, of the Utah Constitution or exercised supplemental 
jurisdiction over any state law claim of uniformity. (R3 l 89-R3190) The Tenth Circuit 
was completely silent as to the language of Article I, § 24, of the Utah Constitution: 
Within the complaint there are only 14 paragraphs citing to the Utah Constitution. 
(R3079, 162; R3082, 178; 3135, 1363; R3137, 1373; R3143, 1407; R3144, 1417; R3151, 1459; 
R3158, 11494, 496, and 497; R3159, 1500; R3 l 66, 1543; and R3172, 1574) Those allegations 
pertain to showing falsity of statements, distinguishing issues not litigated; change in material 
operative facts; clearly established law pertinent to immunity; and legal claim of entitlement 
arising under State law. (Case 2: l 2-cv-00997-TS, Doc. 38, pp. 9, 11, 16; Doc. 39, pp. 9-11, 18; 
Doc. 40, pp. 7, 10, 13, 21, 23-24, 27, 57) (Case 2:12-cv-00997-TS, Doc. 38, pp. 9, 11, 16, 24-
25, 46, 61-62; Doc. 39, pp. 9-11, 18, 46, 48-49, 50-51; Doc. 40, pp. 7, I 0, 13, 21, 23-24, 27, 46, 
52, 55, 57-59) As acknowledged to the trial court, Haik admits these State constitutional 
allegations were made. The fact State constitutional principles are alleged relating to immunity 
and the like does not equate to adjudication. 
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"'Indeed, when a court is confronted with a state constitutional claim, the starting point is 
the language of the state constitution." Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17. 
Silence does not suffice: 'This Court has, in fact, developed a standard for 
reviewing legislative classifications under article I, section 24, which is at least as 
exacting and, in some circumstances, more rigorous than the standard applied under the 
federal constitution." Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 
889 (Utah 1988). Utah Constitution Article XI, § 6, establishes a classification by which 
"different treatment being given persons who are, in fact, similarly situated" to "the 
detriment of some of those so classified" should be measured. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 888 (Utahl 988). 
Haik's counterclaims allege: "The City asserts water sales to Lots 9, 13, and 21 of 
Albion Basin Subdivision were authorized by change application a16846 (57-10015)." 
(R2764 if50) "As of the date of the City's letter, the City's water sales records disclose 
water charges for Lots 9, 13, and 21 of Albion Basin Subdivision # I without metering 
and without regard to any contract limitation as was asserted in the letter to the Town of 
Alta and the Salt Lake Valley Health Department." (R2766 if63) "The City takes 
inconsistent positions regarding contract: on one hand the City asserts only 50 gallons per 
day are contractually available under a 1963 Agreement, and on the other asserts: 'The 
only thing that has changed since 1997 is that the 1963 Agreement has been abandoned.' 
(R2765 ,53) The City admits "application al 6846 allows the City to use more than the 
amount of water described in the 1963 Agreement in Albion Basin". (R2765 ,54) 
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Yet, the City sent a letter to the Town of Alta and the Salt Lake Valley Health 
Department asserting "The amount of water allowed under the contract cannot exceed 50 
gallons per day per connection." (R2765 1155-56) The counterclaim alleges: 
"Counterclaim Plaintiffs contend the different treatment given them as opposed to other 
inhabitants within the City's municipal service area though residing outside the municipal 
corporate boundaries in receiving approvals or supply are not based upon differences that 
have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of Article XI, § 6 and are so 
discriminatory as to violate uniformity required by Article I, Section 24." (R2769 177) 
One lot is supplied water under Water Right No. 57-10015 (a16846) while the lot across 
the street in the same subdivision is subjected to an abandoned contract limit. That is 
stark, disparate treatment which denies an express State constitutional right. 
Classifying one lot as water worthy under a municipal water right approved to 
serve a subdivision but denying water to another lot in that subdivision under pretense of 
an abandoned contract limit not applied to the water worthy lot raises question: "We must 
also look closely at how the tests have actually been applied." Mountain Fuel Supply Co. 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 889 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1988). 
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"When determining the constitutionality of a statute under the uniform operation 
of laws provision, we ask (1) what classifications the statute creates; (2) 'whether 
different classes ... are treated disparately'; and (3) if there is disparate treatment 
between classes, 'whether the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the 
disparity.' State v. Angilau, 201 I UT 3, ,r 21. "In deciding if a classification is 
reasonable, we have considered: (I) if there is a greater burden on one class as opposed to 
another without a reason; (2) if the statute results in unfair discrimination; (3) if the 
statute creates a classification that is arbitrary or unreasonable; or (4) if the statute singles 
out similarly situated people or groups without justification." Merrill v. Utah Labor 
Comm'n, 2009 UT 26, ,r 10. The Tenth Circuit used a profoundly different two-step 
analysis. (R3 l 89) Given municipal water right is at issue, Article XI, §6, of the Utah 
Constitution should trigger a heightened degree of scrutiny. 
Recognizing differences in constitutional standards, this Court follows "the 
primacy approach, which dictates an analysis of state constitutional law before addressing 
any federal constitutional claims." Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ,r 46. The trial 
court departed from primacy and erred due to the differing constitutional standards: 
"Because the state and federal standards for determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to 
damages for a constitutional violation are different, a federal court determination that the 
material undisputed facts do not give rise to a federal constitutional violation does not 
preclude a state court from deciding whether those same facts will give rise to a state 
constitutional violation.'' Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ~ 49. 
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f. City Violated LUOMA Which Was Never Before Adjudicated 
As to the third counterclaim, the City again obfuscates asserting in reference to 
due process "Whether Mr. Haik has such a property interest was decided in Haik I and 
again in Haik II." (City Br. p. 17) But no due process claims were asserted in Haik I. 
(R3 046-R3 06 5) 
Rather, in Haik I, Haik alleged "Alta has not formally exercised the power of 
eminent domain in taking the Haiks' property, or otherwise compensated the Haiks for 
this taking, in violation of Article I, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution." (R3057 141) 
Judge Jenkins in denying taking focused upon whether water was "legally 'available"' 
"outside Alta's 1976 limits without the consent of the proprietor, Salt Lake City". 
(R3231) There was no analysis of whether Article XI, § 6, of the Utah Constitution gave 
rise to a "property" right. (R3228-R323 l) On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held only "that 
no taking occurred under the Utah Constitution Article I, § 22_;, (R3242) The dicta 
"mere expectation of municipal water in the future is not a legal right that constitutes 
property subject to taking" is not fair adjudication of whether Article XI, § 6, of the Utah 
Constitution gives rise to entitlement constituting property under the purview of due 
process protection of the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7. (R3242) The 
regulation at issue was ''the health department requirement of 400 gallons of water per 
day per unit". (R3242) 
In Haik II, the Federal District Court asserted "That provision (Article XI, § 6) 
states that municipalities are forbidden from leasing, selling, alienating, or disposing their 
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waterworks, water rights, or sources of water supply, but that such may be used to supply 
its inhabitants with water at reasonable charges." (R3202)(Emphasis added.) Utah 
Constitution Article XI, § 6, actually provides "all such waterworks, water rights and 
sources of water supply now owned or hereafter to be acquired by any municipal 
corporation, shall be preserved, maintained and operated by it for supplying its 
inhabitants with water at reasonable charges". (Emphasis added.) Utah Constitution 
Article I, § 26 provides "The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise." The Federal 
District Court interpreted language different than the plain language of the Utah 
Constitution. (R3202) The Tenth Circuit then interpreted its prior dicta as an 
adjudication and sua sponte raised issue preclusion which the City had not raised on 
appeal. (R3 l 87-R3 l 88) 
Regardless the unfairness and lack of full opportunity to litigate sua sponte issue 
preclusion (an issue not raised by Appellee on appeal), Haik II could not, and did not, 
adjudicate how Article XI, § 6, or related appropriation statutes apply to subsequent 
claim of injury arising from Haik' s water right. (R2002, iJ24; R20 I 7, if 119) 
There is nothing in the prior decisions which adjudicates anything about Haik's 
water right. His right is a private water right wholly separate from the City's water rights 
subject to Article XI, § 6. A totally new set of material facts arise from the City's new 
suit putting at issue its water rights by alleging Haik' s private water right injures or 
interferes with the City's water rights. (R2002, ~24~ R2017, ~119) The preclusion 
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doctrine does not bar adjudication applying Article XI, § 6, to materially new and 
independent circumstances of alleged injury and interference arising from Haik's water 
right. 
By focusing upon the prior decisions rather than the pleadings in this action, the 
City fails to address what the third counterclaim actually alleged: "Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs seek declaration determining their rights, status, and other legal relations as to 
the City arising from or relating to Article I, §7; and whether the expressed intent to deny 
water certification for purposes of controlling development in Albion Basin afforded due 
process protections as set forth in the provisions of the Municipal Land Use, 
Development, and Management Act, Utah Code §§10-9a-101 et seq.; or Utah Code §§ 
10-3-704-05 or 10-3-711." (R2780 ,127) 
The City simply refuses to recognize Haik has his own water right adjudicated by 
this Court. See, Haik v. Sandy City, 2011 UT 26 ("We therefore affirm the district 
court's entry of summary judgment quieting title to the water right in favor of the Haik 
Parties.") Having sued Haik alleging Haik's water right "materially injure Plaintiffs" and 
"will interfere with the Plaintiffs' respective rights to divert, treat and provide LCC 
water"; Haik is fully entitled to declaration regarding City acts stopping Haik' s use of his 
water right. Whether the City's acts of denying certification as means to "control 
development' after Haik acquired the "missing strand" (separately, independently from 
entitlement to public water) violate LUDMA is ripe for adjudication. (R2725-R2726, 
,,~8-11) 
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"The expressed intent of denying new water certifications evidenced in the 
memoranda of the Director of Public Utilities do not disclose passage or enactment by the 
governing body of the City; are not in the mandated form of an ordinance, Utah Code §§ 
10-3-704-05; and do not include disclosure of publication or posting, Utah Code § 10-3-
711." (R2773 iJ96) As a result of the City's letter, Salt Lake Valley Health Department 
asserts "... failure to attach the required documentation of a letter from the City 
indicating his access to water, the sole basis for the summary judgment decision of the 
Health Department's hearing Officer" led to denial of approval of sewerage for homes in 
the Albion Basin Subdivision." (R2766 ,I64) The City's acts forced Haik into litigation 
with the Board of Health as recognized by the City. (City Br. p. 6) 
Promising to deny water "as a means of controlling development in the Albion 
Basin" violates rights afforded to Haik under the provisions of the Municipal Land Use, 
Development, and Management Act, Utah Code §§10-9a-101 et seq.; thereby denying 
due process of law protected by Article I, §7, of the Utah Constitution." (R2771 iJ87) 
Utah Code § I 0-8-15 does not confer authority upon Salt Lake City to "control 
development"; that power is conferred by Utah Code I 0-9a- I 02(2) and does not extend to 
the City controlling development in Albion Basin, particularly Albion Basin Subdivision 
within the Town of Alta. (R2773 iJ88) Haik's land ownership and water right more than 
suffice to sustain declaration as to application of LUOMA. The issues plainly differ. 
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g. City's Allegations Put Validity of City's Rights At Issue 
As to the fourth counterclaim the City again obfuscates. To be clear, Haik pled 
"Counterclaim Plaintiffs seek declaration determining the validity of appropriation by the 
City as expressed in Water Right 57-10015 (al6846) or Water Right 57-10013 (a16844) 
due to an expressed intent not ( 1) to apply the appropriated water to the stated beneficial 
use; and (2) refusal and failure to supply appropriated water within a reasonable time to 
the stated beneficial use." (R278 l iJ 129) Haik further pled "Counterclaim Plaintiffs seek 
declaration determining the continued validity of appropriation by the City as expressed 
in Water Right 57-10015 (al6846) or Water Right 57-10013 (a16844) due to failure to 
apply the appropriated water to the stated beneficial use." (R2781 iJ130) 
The City alleged that these rights were "materially" injured and will be 
"interfered" with by Haik's water right. By pleading injury and interference to these 
water rights, the City opened the door to declaration whether the "injured" or interfered" 
rights were validly appropriated or remain valid. Invalid water rights cannot be injured 
or interfered with by Haik. Utah Code § 73-3-14 does not bar that declaration given that 
the City sued. Haik is not claiming the right to acquire use under appropriative law but 
rather whether the City's rights can be a basis for alleged injury or interference. The 
fourth counterclaim is not a collateral attack. 
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h. City Erroneously Argues Deference 
It is precisely the City's claim of material injury to and interference with the City's 
water rights which changes the circumstances. Those changed circumstances are what 
defeat the City's contentions as to claim and issue preclusion. Having placed material 
injury to and interference with the City's water rights at issue; the City opened the door to 
declaration. Pointing back then to prior Federal courts interpretations of the Utah 
constitution lacks merit. Only this Court holds "authority and obligation to interpret 
Utah's constitutional guarantees, including the scope of due process, and we owe federal 
law no more deference in that regard than we do sister state interpretation of identical 
state language." State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 (2007); Gray v. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 
681 P.2d 807 (Utah 1984). All the City is doing is arguing deference, which is a mistake. 
Deference is very inappropriate because the Federal courts wrongly departed from 
proper State constitutional analysis. As noted above, none of Federal courts began their 
interpretation with the language other than that of Article XI, § 6. The Federal District 
Court changed the word "shall" to ·'may"; the Tenth Circuit sua sponte interpreted an 
Article l, § 22, ruling as adjudication of Article XI, § 6; asserting "Nothing about this 
process requires the successful applicant to perfect or to use the water in the manner 
approved." (R3 l 88) That statement cannot be reconciled to this Court's precedence. 
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This Court's seminal cases are clear: "'the three principal elements to constitute a 
valid appropriation of water" are: "(I) intent to apply it to some beneficial use; (2) a 
diversion from the natural channel by means of a ditch, canal, or other structure; and (3) 
an application of it within a reasonable time to some useful industry." Sowards v. 
Meagher, 108 P. 1112, 1116 (Utah 1910). Appropriating water imposes a duty to use: 
He may not file his application, construct his works, and then hold the 
water and wait for something to happen. He cannot withhold the water from 
the proposed beneficial use. 
Sowards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212,225, 108 P. 1112, 1117 (1910). "An appropriative 
water right depends on beneficial use for its continued validity." In re Bear, 819 P .2d 
770, 775 (Utah 1991). 
From that direct conflict with this Court's long-standing precedence, the Federal 
court then announced an issue of first impression; a narrow, restrictive interpretation of 
the word "inhabitant" as used in Article XI, § 6. (R3 I 88-R3189) While acknowledging 
Haik's lot lays within the City approved service area, the Federal courts announced that 
only persons within the corporate municipal boundaries are entitled to constitutional 
protection. This narrow, restrictive reading appears wholly at odds with this Court's 
precedence that "Sec. 6, Art. 11, should not be narrowly or strictly construed." Genola 
Town v. Santaquin City, 80 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1938). There is real need for this Court 
to clarify, uphold, or reject its prior precedence as the conflicts are direct and 
irreconcilable. Arguing deference does not help the City. 
24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
III. CONCLUSION 
By ignoring U. R. Civ. App. 24(a), the City did not address its pleading putting at 
issue the City's water rights and use; and, thereby properly giving rise to the declaratory 
relief pied in the counterclaims such that the decision must be reversed. The entirety of 
the City's arguments ignore and defy the proper standard of review. 
The trial court was charged to independently analyze State constitutional 
guarantees in order to apply preclusion. The trial court failed to do so. The primacy rule 
articulated by this Court directed State constitutional analysis because there are clearly 
differing tests and more rigorous potential in applying State constitutional guarantees. 
Reversal and remand with guidance must follow. 
DATED: November 3, 2016 
-;I~e+~d_ 
PA R. HAIK 
Attorney of Record 
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